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WHAT YOU DON’T KNOW CAN’T HURT 
YOU UNLESS YOU WORK FOR JPMORGAN 
CHASE: THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S REFUSAL 
TO NOTIFY POTENTIAL FLSA PLAINTIFFS 
UNDER ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 
Abstract: On February 21, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit held in In re JPMorgan Chase & Co. that district courts may not send or 
require notice of a pending Fair Labor Standards Act collective action to employ-
ees bound by arbitration agreements. The decision represented a matter of first 
impression among the federal courts of appeals. This Comment argues that the 
Fifth Circuit’s decision correctly applied the 1989 Supreme Court case, Hoff-
mann-La Roche v. Sperling, which gave district courts the power to facilitate no-
tice in collective actions, to the new reality of arbitration agreements. This Com-
ment further contends that, although the Fifth Circuit’s opinion was legally cor-
rect, it creates case law that could minimize the effectiveness of Fair Labor 
Standards Act collective action suits. 
INTRODUCTION 
The primary goal of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) is to eliminate 
dangerous working conditions and check unfair business practices by regulat-
ing the wages and hours of workers.1 The Department of Labor publicly en-
forces the FLSA, and individual employee-plaintiffs who consolidate similar 
claims into collective actions can privately enforce it.2 In 1989, in Hoffmann-
La Roche v. Sperling, the United States Supreme Court attempted to help the 
private enforcement mechanism run more efficiently by giving federal district 
courts discretion to facilitate notice of pending FLSA actions to potential em-
ployee-plaintiffs.3 As a result, district courts developed a two-stage certifica-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 202 (2018) (declaring the policy 
underlying the FLSA). 
 2 Id. § 216(b) (providing that a Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) action can be brought on behalf 
of a singular employee or on behalf of all employees similarly situated). 
 3 See Hoffmann-La Roche v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 172 (1989) (holding that district courts have 
discretion to facilitate notice to potential plaintiffs). Hoffmann-La Roche v. Sperling involved a collec-
tive action brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), but because the 
ADEA uses the same statutory language concerning collective actions as the FLSA, the holding ap-
plies to both types of collective action. See id. at 167 (noting that the language of the ADEA mirrors 
§ 216(b) of the FLSA); see also 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 
U.S.C. § 626(b) (2018). 
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tion process for collective action suits.4 Stage one consists of conditionally 
certifying a list of potential employee-plaintiffs for notice purposes.5 Stage two 
consists of a more rigorous process in which defendants aim to decertify spe-
cific employee-plaintiffs who opted in.6 The rise in the prevalence of employee 
arbitration agreements, however, has strained the functionality of this frame-
work, as most standard arbitration agreements will waive an employee’s right 
to join a collective action.7 
In 2019, in In re JPMorgan Chase & Co., the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit considered when and how district courts should han-
dle arbitration agreements during the certification and notice process of FLSA 
collective actions.8 Although district courts across the country had considered 
this issue, no appellate court had ever reviewed it.9 As a result, district courts 
remain split on the issue.10 Some district courts have decided to assess and en-
force the binding arbitration agreements before the conditional certification 
                                                                                                                           
 4 See In re JPMorgan Chase & Co., 916 F.3d 494, 500 n.9 (5th Cir. 2019) (calling the two-stage 
certification processes the popular approach); see, e.g., Reeves v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 77 F. 
Supp. 2d 242, 246–247 (D.R.I. 1999) (adopting the practice of two–stage certification and referencing 
its use by other district courts); Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 1213–14, 1216 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(describing the two–stage certification process, referred to as the “Lusardi method” and upholding the 
district court’s use of it). 
 5 Mooney, 54 F.3d at 1213–14. 
 6 Id. at 1214; see also Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, 551 F.3d 1233, 1261 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(describing the two-stage certification). Stage two is more rigorous because it occurs after discovery, 
so the court has much more information on which to base to its decision whether claimants are in fact 
similarly situated. Mooney, 54 F.3d at 1213–14. 
 7 See In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 499 n.6 (noting that the recurring issue of how to deal 
with potential employee-plaintiffs bound by arbitration agreements has split district courts). Arbitra-
tion is an alternative dispute resolution process in which a neutral party, chosen by the disputing par-
ties, makes a final, binding decision resolving the dispute. Arbitration, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(11th ed. 2019). Roughly twenty-five million Americans are bound by arbitration agreements, a num-
ber that has steadily increased since the early 2000s. Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How 
American Employers Are Using Mandatory Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 
BROOKLYN L. REV. 1309, 1310 n.8, 1317 n.47 (2015) (providing estimates on the number of em-
ployment arbitration agreements (citing Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment 
Arbitration: Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405, 411 (2007))). 
 8 In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 502–04. 
 9 Id. at 499–500, 499 n.6. 
 10 Id. (noting that the issue was increasingly recurring and was causing district court splitting). 
Compare Hudgins v. Total Quality Logistics, LLC, No. 16 C 7331, 2017 WL 514191, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 
Feb. 8, 2017) (refusing to notify those who signed arbitration agreements), with Sawyer v. Health 
Care Sols. at Home, Inc., No. 5:16-cv-5674, 2018 WL 1959632, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2018) (hold-
ing that signing arbitration agreements does not preclude employees from conditional certification, as 
they have a right to receive notice), with Weckesser v. Knight Enters. S.E., LLC, Civil Action No. 
2:16-CV-02053-RMG, 2018 WL 4087931, at *3 (D.S.C. Aug. 27, 2018) (allowing conditional certifi-
cation of opt-in employee-plaintiffs subject to arbitration agreements because the court deals with the 
issue of arbitration agreement validity after discovery). 
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stage and thus not notify employees who signed the agreements.11 Others have 
decided to notify those employees, allow them to opt into the class action, and 
wait until the decertification process to assess and enforce the arbitration 
agreements.12 
After analyzing the decision in Hoffmann-La Roche and its policy ration-
ales, the Fifth Circuit decided to enforce arbitration agreements at the condi-
tional certification stage.13 As a result of this holding, district courts in the 
Fifth Circuit must not notify any employee who signs a binding arbitration 
agreement of pending FLSA collective action suits.14 This Comment argues 
that the Fifth Circuit faithfully applied Hoffmann-La Roche, but that its deci-
sion may consequently demolish the private enforcement mechanism of the 
FLSA.15 Part I gives an overview of the legal and factual history of In re 
JPMorgan Chase.16 Part II examines and discusses the district court split be-
fore the Fifth Circuit’s decision and where the Fifth Circuit’s decision fits 
within existing frameworks.17 Finally, Part III argues that although the Fifth 
Circuit’s ruling was legally correct, it creates a potential loophole by which 
employers can significantly avoid FLSA collective actions.18 
I. LEGAL AND FACTUAL CONTEXT 
In a matter of first impression, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in In re 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. held that district courts do not have discretion to send 
a notice of a FLSA collective action to employees who are precluded from 
joining class actions by binding arbitration agreements.19 Section A of this Part 
                                                                                                                           
 11 See infra notes 57–60 and accompanying text (discussing the “First Approach” district courts 
used to address the issue before the Fifth Circuit’s decision). 
 12 See infra notes 61–68 and accompanying text (discussing the “Second Approach” and “Third 
Approach” that courts utilized prior to the Fifth Circuit’s decision). 
 13 In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 503 (citing Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 174) (holding 
that it is outside a district court’s discretion to send notice of a pending FLSA collective action to 
employees who are under binding arbitration agreements); see Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 174 
(articulating that the purpose of notice facilitation is the need for efficient disposition in a singular 
proceeding). 
 14 In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 503 (holding that a district court within the Fifth Circuit 
shall not send notice of a pending FLSA collective action to employees who are under binding arbitra-
tion agreements). A ruling by the Fifth Circuit is only binding on the district courts within the Fifth 
Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2018) (establishing the federal courts of appeals and their jurisdiction). 
 15 See infra notes 19–102 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 19–52 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 53–76 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 77–102 and accompanying text. 
 19 In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 502–04. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals determined 
that, although the Supreme Court’s decision in Hoffmann-La Roche v. Sperling gave the district court 
discretion to facilitate notice of FLSA collective action claims to potential employee-plaintiffs, it did 
not allow for notice to employee-plaintiffs who were bound by arbitration agreements. Id.; see Hoff-
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provides an overview of the law relating to FLSA collective actions.20 Section 
B details the facts and procedural history of In re JPMorgan Chase.21 
A. The FLSA Collective Action and the Issue of Notice and Certification 
Section 216(b) of the FLSA permits an employee to bring a collective ac-
tion against an employer on behalf of other “similarly situated employees.”22 
The primary goal of the class action mechanism is to combine similar employ-
ee claims so that employees can afford the heavy costs of enforcing their rights 
under the FLSA.23 The original version of Section 216(b) mirrored the proce-
dure of class actions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which automat-
ically binds similarly situated parties to the suit without the parties taking any 
affirmative action.24 Worried about the economic effect of expanded employer 
liability, however, Congress passed the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, which 
amended the FLSA to require similarly situated employees to opt into the ac-
tion by filing written consent with the court.25 
Because FLSA collective actions require employee-plaintiffs to affirma-
tively opt in via written consent, notice of FLSA claims to potentially similarly 
situated employees is particularly important.26 Unlike Rule 23, however, Sec-
                                                                                                                           
mann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 172 (giving district courts discretion in facilitating notice to potential 
employee-plaintiffs of FLSA collective action claims).  
 20 See infra notes 22–38 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 39–52 and accompanying text. 
 22 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 498. In determining whether employ-
ee-plaintiffs are similarly situated, the Fifth Circuit has no set definition. See Mooney, 54 F.3d at 
1213–14 (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the FLSA’s “similarly situated” requirement). 
Rather courts perform ad hoc inquiries focused on similarities in the employment settings of individu-
al employee-plaintiffs, similarities in defenses available to employers against each employee-plaintiff, 
and fairness considerations. Id. at 1215.  
 23 G.W. Foster, Jr., Jurisdiction, Rights, and Remedies for Group Wrongs Under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act: Special Federal Questions, 1975 WIS. L. REV. 295, 296–97 (citing 83 CONG. REC. 9, 
264 (1938)) (explaining that Section 216(b) gives the means and ability to individual employees, 
through cost-effective collective action, to enforce their own rights). Congress enacted the FLSA to 
eliminate substandard working conditions and check unfair business practices by regulating workers’ 
wages and hours. 29 U.S.C. § 202. In drafting the collective action provision, Congress envisioned 
that private suits brought by collections of individual workers would supplement public enforcement 
by the Department of Labor. See Foster, supra, at 296–97 (explaining private enforcement and public 
enforcement). 
 24 Compare Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 16(b), ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060, 1069 (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)) (declining to require absent parties to opt in), with FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(c)(2) (omitting an opt-in requirement); see also Foster, supra note 23, at 325–26 (referring to the 
significant influence of Rule 23 on FLSA collective actions). 
 25 Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 49, 5, 61 Stat. 84, 84, 87 (codified as amended at 29 
U.S.C. § 216(b)). Congress recognized that the liability created by automatically binding similarly 
situated parties might create financial problems for employers, which would then negatively affect the 
United States economy. 29 U.S.C. § 251(a). 
 26 See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (requiring FLSA employee-plaintiffs to file written consent to join). If 
potential plaintiffs do not know that such an action is pending, there is no way they can know to opt 
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tion 216(b) does not specifically empower district courts to facilitate notice of 
pending collective actions to potential class members.27 In 1989, the Supreme 
Court resolved whether district courts may facilitate such notice in the seminal 
case on FLSA collective action procedure, Hoffmann-La Roche v. Sperling.28 
In Hoffmann-La Roche, the Court held that district courts have the broad dis-
cretion to facilitate notice of pending FLSA actions to potential opt-in employ-
ee-plaintiffs.29 The Court clarified, however, that this did not give district 
courts unchecked discretion in managing these actions, and that district courts 
must exercise this authority to promote judicial efficiency, as well as to avoid 
the appearance of endorsing the merits of the action.30 
Although Hoffmann-La Roche made clear that district courts have discre-
tion to facilitate notice in Section 216(b) actions, the Court expressly declined 
to establish a framework for the exercise of such discretion.31 As a result, 
courts have independently developed procedures to decide whether potential 
employee-plaintiffs are similarly situated and whether to certify the class.32 
The practice of a two-stage certification has become the norm.33 In stage one, 
                                                                                                                           
in. See id. As such, notifying similarly situated employees is key to gaining substantial involvement 
from the employees to spread the cost of the action. See Foster, supra note 23, at 264 (explaining that 
the goal of the collective action provision is to make private suits economically feasible for employee-
plaintiffs). 
 27 Compare 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (failing to specify procedures for notifying putative, opt-in plain-
tiffs of pending actions), with FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2) (setting forth notice provisions to inform puta-
tive, opt-out plaintiffs of pending class actions). 
 28 Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 169–74 (granting district courts the authority to facilitate 
FLSA notice to potential employee-plaintiffs). Hoffmann-La Roche concerned a collective action 
brought under the ADEA, but because the ADEA used the same language for its collective actions as 
that contained in Section 216(b), the holding applies to both types of collective action. See id. at 167 
(noting that the language of Section 216(b) of the FLSA is mirrored in the ADEA). 
 29 See id. at 171–72 (stating that because trial courts are in the best position to efficiently handle 
joinder of additional parties, it is within their discretion to handle joinder under FLSA claims). 
 30 Id. at 171, 174. 
 31 Id. at 170. 
 32 See In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 500 n.9 (referring to other methods district courts often 
use); see also Mooney, 54 F.3d at 1214 (describing two different types of class certification proce-
dures). 
 33 See In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 500 (making the same observation regarding the pre-
dominance of the two-stage certification). This two-stage certification procedure was clearly laid out 
in Lusardi v. Xerox Corp. 118 F.R.D. 351, 374 (D.N.J. 1987); see In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 
500 (referring to two-stage certification as the “Lusardi method”). District courts in the First, Fourth, 
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have formally adopted the 
two-stage certification process. See Carl Engstrom, Note, What Have I Opted Myself Into? Resolving 
the Uncertain Status of Opt-In Plaintiffs Prior to Conditional Certification in Fair Labor Standards 
Act Litigation, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1544, 1551, 1553 n.51 (2012) (citing decisions from these circuits 
adopting this approach); see, e.g., Morgan v. Family Tree Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1261 (11th Cir. 
2008) (mandating the use of two-stage certification by Eleventh Circuit district courts); Thiessen v. 
Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1105 (10th Cir. 2001) (approving the two-stage certification 
process within the Tenth Circuit). The only times courts seem to stray from this norm is when most 
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known as the conditional certification stage, the district court applies a lenient 
standard to decide whether potential employee-plaintiffs are similarly situated 
based only on the pleadings and any affidavits submitted by potential opt-in 
plaintiffs.34 If so, the court conditionally certifies the class and orders notice of 
the action.35 In stage two, following the defendant’s motion for decertification, 
the court applies a more stringent standard and either certifies the class for the 
final time or refuses to do so and dismisses the potential opt-in employee-
plaintiffs.36 
This two-step certification process provides the model for FLSA collec-
tive actions.37 District courts, however, are divided on whether to conditionally 
certify, and thus give notice to, potential employee-plaintiffs bound by arbitra-
tion agreements with class action waivers.38 
                                                                                                                           
discovery has already occurred and district courts have enough information to directly make a second-
stage determination. Id. 
 34 See, e.g., Mooney, 54 F.3d at 1213–14 (describing in depth the two-stage certification process). 
The first stage is considered lenient because it requires nothing more than substantial allegations that 
the class members were victims of a single policy or decision. Id. at 1214 n.8. To determine whether 
an employee is similarly situated, courts engage in an ad hoc inquiry, focusing on the similarities 
between the employee’s situations, the defenses available to the employer, and overarching fairness. 
Id. at 1215. This stage is referred to as conditional certification because final certification of the class 
is conditioned upon stage two. Id. 
 35 Id. at 1214. 
 36 See id. (referencing courts’ use of the extensive discovery record). Stage two is usually initiated 
by a defendant’s motion for decertification, which aims at removing certain opt-in plaintiffs from the 
previously conditionally certified class when they are not in fact similarly situated. Id. The motion for 
decertification is filed after discovery, meaning that the court has much more information on which to 
base its similarly-situated decision. Id. If the court still finds that the opt-in plaintiffs are similarly 
situated, it will certify the class for the final time, and the case proceeds to trial. Id. If, on the other 
hand, the court finds that the opt-in plaintiffs are not similarly situated, the court dismisses them from 
the action without prejudice. Id. 
 37 See In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 500 (calling the two-stage certification process the 
popular approach). 
 38 See id. at 499–500, 499 n.6 (noting that potential employee-plaintiffs being bound by arbitra-
tion agreements is a recurring issue that has led to splitting); see, e.g., Weckesser, 2018 WL 4087931, 
at *3 (allowing conditional certification of opt-in employee-plaintiffs subject to arbitration agree-
ments); Hudgins, 2017 WL 514191, at *4 (refusing to notify those who signed arbitration agree-
ments). This problem is exacerbated by the fact that roughly twenty-five million Americans—or twen-
ty percent of the non-unionized American workforce—are covered by arbitration agreements, as well 
as the fact that the Supreme Court has recently favored arbitration. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Con-
cepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (promoting a federal policy of upholding arbitration agreements 
when valid under contract law); Andrew D. Bradt & D.T. Rave, Aggregation on Defendants’ Terms: 
Bristol-Myers Squibb and the Federalization of Mass-Tort Litigation, 59 B.C.L. REV. 1251, 1266 
(2018) (remarking that Supreme Court case law regarding enforcement of arbitration agreements has 
stifled collective litigation); Sternlight, supra note 7, at 1310 (estimating that twenty percent of Amer-
ican employees are bound by arbitration agreements).  
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B. JPMorgan Chase’s Request Not to Conditionally Certify and Notify 
Potential Employee-Plaintiffs Bound by Arbitration Agreements 
In December 2017, Shannon Rivenbark filed a FLSA suit against JPMor-
gan Chase & Co. (JPMorgan Chase) on behalf of herself and all 42,000 indi-
viduals employed in JPMorgan Chase call centers from December 14, 2014 
through the resolution of the case.39 Eighty-five percent of the collective class 
signed a binding arbitration agreement.40 The agreement made arbitration 
mandatory for all employee claims against JPMorgan Chase and waived em-
ployees’ rights to participate in collective actions.41 In May 2018, Rivenbark 
moved for conditional certification of the collective action, which would satis-
fy stage one of the two-stage certification process.42 On December 10, 2018, 
following a hearing on the motion, the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas conditionally certified the collective action.43 The 
district court reasoned that it could not conclude whether the arbitration 
agreement precluded class members from joining the action until JPMorgan 
                                                                                                                           
 39 In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 494; Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 4, In re JPMorgan 
Chase, 916 F.3d 494 (No. 4:17-CV-3786). Rivenbark alleged that all call-center employees worked 
several hours “off-the-clock” for which they were not paid as a result of corporate policy that required 
all call-center employees to take their first phone call the moment that their official shift started. Peti-
tion for Writ of Mandamus, supra, at 4; Plaintiff’s Original Collective Complaint at 6, Rivenbark v. 
JPMorgan Chase & Co., 340 F. Supp. 3d 619 (S.D. Tex. 2018) (No. 4:17-CV-3786). This policy al-
legedly required Rivenbark and the putative class members to start and log into their computers, 
launch eight to ten different software programs, log into each program, and ensure that the programs 
were operating properly. Plaintiff’s Original Collective Complaint, supra, at 6. This accounted for 
thirty minutes to one hour of daily startup time, which, in a five-day work week, equaled approximate-
ly two-and-a-half to five hours of “off-the-clock” work per week for which Rivenbark and the putative 
class members were not paid. Id. 
 40 In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 497. 
 41 See Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 39, at 5 (quoting the arbitration agreement that 
JPMorgan Chase required employees to sign). Since mid-2009, all new JPMorgan Chase employees 
have assented to the arbitration agreement with the collective action waiver. Id. Under the waiver, em-
ployees must pursue their claims on an individual basis rather than in a collective manner. Id. 
 42 See Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 39, at 5; see, e.g., Mooney, 54 F.3d at 1213–14 
(describing that conditional certification satisfies stage one of the certification process). The plaintiffs 
relied on the lenient standard for conditional certification, which usually leads to conditional certifica-
tion of and notice to the putative class. Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 39, at 5; see 
Mooney, 54 F.3d at 1213–14 (describing the relaxed standard of conditional certification). In re-
sponse, JPMorgan Chase contended that the court should not conditionally certify the class nor give 
notice to those employees who assented to the agreement, because doing so would be contrary to the 
agreements and the Federal Arbitration Act. Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 39, at 6; see 
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2018) (permitting a party to petition a district court to 
enforce an arbitration agreement). In response, the plaintiffs clarified that they did not contest the 
validity or enforceability of the agreements, but rather that the agreements could not preclude employ-
ees’ rights to receive notice of their FLSA rights. Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 39, at 6. 
 43 In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 497–98. At the hearing, the district court referred to the 
plaintiffs and potential plaintiffs as “victims of illegality” and suggested that not providing notice 
would disenfranchise employees beyond the relinquishment of individual rights affected by the arbi-
tration agreements. Id. at 503. 
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Chase moved to compel arbitration.44 As such, those under the arbitration 
agreement were potential employee-plaintiffs whom the court could notify.45 
Following the conditional certification of the collective action, JPMorgan 
Chase moved for interlocutory appeal and an emergency stay of the order, both 
of which the district court denied.46 As a result, on December 20, 2018, JPMor-
gan Chase filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals that attempted to exclude any employee who signed the arbitration 
agreement from receiving notice of the collective action.47 JPMorgan Chase 
argued that the Fifth Circuit should reverse the district court’s decision to con-
ditionally certify the class and notify the call-center employees who were 
bound by arbitration agreements because, under Hoffmann-La Roche, district 
courts have no authority to require notice for individuals who cannot partici-
pate in a collective action as a result of arbitration agreements.48 Alternatively, 
it argued that the district court erroneously treated the arbitration agreement as 
presumptively invalid by refusing to enforce it.49 
Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit denied JPMorgan Chase’s petition on the 
grounds that the district court did not patently err, because its decision aligned 
with every other district court in the Fifth Circuit that addressed the issue.50 
                                                                                                                           
 44 Id. The court’s analysis of this question was brief and did not advance any further reasoning. 
See id. (lacking a robust analysis of the exclusion of class members prior to a motion to compel arbi-
tration). 
 45 Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 39, at 7–8. Along with the certification, the district 
court ordered that the plaintiff transmit notification to all putative members by first class mail and e-
mail. In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 498. 
 46 In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 498; see 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2018) (giving district court 
judges the authority for interlocutory appeal). An interlocutory appeal is one that occurs before the 
trial court’s final ruling on the case. Interlocutory Appeal, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 7.  
 47 In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 498–99. A writ of mandamus is a writ issued by an appel-
late court to force particular action on behalf of a lower court in order to correct the lower court’s 
prior failure. Writ of Mandamus, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 7. A writ of mandamus is an 
unusual remedy limited to actions in which there are no other appropriate means of relief. In re 
JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 499 (citing Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380–81 
(2004)). Courts typically only grant the remedy when petitioners clearly establish their entitlement to 
it. Id. JPMorgan Chase argued that the district court’s certification necessitated a grant of mandamus 
because providing notice to employees who could not participate in a collective action was an over-
extension of judicial power. Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 39, at 10–13. JPMorgan Chase 
also emphasized the importance of the case beyond the Fifth Circuit, where district courts had split 
over the certification and notice issues in the absence of guidance from federal courts of appeals. Id. at 
19–20. JPMorgan Chase simultaneously sought a motion for an emergency stay of the notice order 
pending resolution of the petition, which the court granted on December 21, 2018. JPMorgan Chase, 
916 F.3d at 499.  
 48 Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 39, at 10–13. 
 49 Id. at 15–19. The petitioners argued that before inviting arbitration agreement signers to partic-
ipate in a collective, a court needs to conclude that the arbitration agreements are unenforceable. Id. 
Thus, because the court did not analyze the agreements, it treated them as presumptively invalid, 
which is in direct opposition to the liberal federal policy favoring such agreements. Id. 
 50 In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 504. In its analysis of whether to grant the writ, the Fifth 
Circuit determined that there was no other adequate means of relief because the district court denied 
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Nonetheless, in its supervisory role, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court 
erred in ordering notice to employees bound by the agreements.51 The Fifth 
Circuit reasoned that Hoffmann-La Roche does not provide district courts with 
the discretion to send notice of FLSA collective actions to those who are una-
ble to join because of binding arbitration agreements.52 
II. LEGAL POSITIONING OF IN RE JPMORGAN CHASE 
Due to the lack of appellate guidance regarding whether plaintiffs may 
send notice of a FLSA collective action to employees bound by arbitration 
agreements, federal district courts have split over the issue, resolving it in three 
major way.53 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s deci-
sion in In re JPMorgan Chase & Co. represented a matter of first impression 
regarding the issue.54 Section A of this Part describes the three resolution 
frameworks district courts have advanced before the Fifth Circuit’s decision in 
In re JPMorgan Chase.55 Section B details the Fifth Circuit’s chosen frame-
work and how its rationale compares to that of the other approaches.56 
                                                                                                                           
interlocutory appeal. Id. at 499. As a result of this denial, the notice issue would be moot upon appeal 
of a final judgment, as the notice would have already occurred. Id. The court ruled that the writ was 
proper due to the prevalence of the issue and the district court split across the country. Id. at 499–500. 
 51 Id. at 504. The Supreme Court has recognized the writ of mandamus as a supervisory tool for 
courts of appeals to correct errant decisions from district courts within their jurisdiction. 16 CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3934.1 (3d ed. 2012). Although, the 
Fifth Circuit determined that the district court did ultimately err, it held that the error was not “clear[] 
and indisputabl[e],” as is required for issuing of a writ of mandamus. In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d 
at 504. 
 52 In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 502 (citing Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 170, 174). 
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the potential employee-plaintiffs whom district courts had discretion to 
notify under Hoffmann-La Roche did not include those bound by arbitration agreements, because such 
employee-plaintiffs would never be eligible to participate in the suit. Id. The court stated that its read-
ing of “potential employee-plaintiffs” aligned with the policy behind Hoffmann-La Roche to provide 
for expedient disposition and avoid encouraging litigation. Id. Additionally, the Fifth Circuit conclud-
ed that the district judge’s decision to notify individuals bound by the arbitration agreements also 
violated the Supreme Court’s instruction to maintain judicial neutrality because of the judge’s refer-
ence to the employees as “victims of illegality.” Id. at 503–04 (citing Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 
170, 174). 
 53 In re JPMorgan Chase & Co., 916 F.3d 494, 499 n.6 (5th Cir. 2019) (noting that the issue of 
potential collective employee-plaintiffs bound by arbitration agreements caused district court split-
ting). The issue was also increasingly litigated. Id. at 499; Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 
39, at 26 (stating that a Westlaw search produces 210 cases on the issue, fifty-two of which were de-
cided in the last two years and only six of which were issued before 2008). 
 54 In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 499–500. No other United States Court of Appeal has ad-
dressed this issue. Id. 
 55 See infra notes 57–68 and accompanying text. 
 56 See infra notes 69–76 and accompanying text. 
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A. Overview of the Three-Framework Split Before  
the Fifth Circuit’s Holding 
One resolution district courts advanced before In re JPMorgan Chase in-
volves simply excluding employees who signed arbitration agreements from 
the conditionally certified collective and from receiving notice (the First Ap-
proach).57 This resolution framework rests on the policy of judicial efficiency 
at the core of the Supreme Court’s 1989 decision in Hoffmann-La Roche v. 
Sperling.58 Expounding from that policy, subsequent district courts provided 
that notifying and adding these potential employee-plaintiffs would waste judi-
cial time and resources because defendants would likely attempt to remove 
them from the litigation based on the arbitration agreements.59 This framework 
assumes that the arbitration agreements are binding and enforceable, and that 
they will therefore necessarily lead to the disqualification of those who signed 
them.60 
By contrast, in the second track district courts have taken before In re 
JPMorgan Chase, courts conditionally certify and notify all potential employ-
ee-plaintiffs who have signed arbitration agreements (the Second Approach).61 
                                                                                                                           
 57 In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 499 n.6 (explaining that district courts have applied three 
distinct frameworks); see, e.g., Hudgins v. Total Quality Logistics, LLC, Case No. 16 C 7331, 2017 
WL 514191, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 2017) (restricting notice to those who have not assented to arbitra-
tion agreements); Fischer v. Kmart Corp., Civ. No. 13-4116, 2014 WL 3817368, at *8 (D.N.J. Aug. 4, 
2014) (holding that employees who consented to an arbitration agreement and collective action waiver 
were prevented from joining the collective action); Morangelli v. Chemed Corp., 10 Civ. 0876 
(BMC), 2010 WL 11622886, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 15, 2010) (precluding those employees who signed 
binding arbitration agreements from joining the class). 
 58 See Hoffmann-La Roche v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170–72 (1989) (explaining that district 
courts’ discretion to facilitate notice is born out of the goal to accelerate resolution of the suit); see, 
e.g., Morangelli, 2010 WL 11622886, at *3 (proclaiming it a failure of efficiency to certify workers 
bound by arbitration agreements because such workers inevitably would be disqualified). 
 59 See Hudgins, 2017 WL 514191, at *4 (citing Daugherty v. Encana Oil & Gas (USA), Inc., 838 
F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1130 (D. Colo. 2011)) (noting the frivolousness of allowing employee-plaintiffs 
with arbitration agreements to join a collective action only to force a defendant to move for dismissal 
based on arbitration agreements); Morangelli, 2010 WL 11622886, at *3 (proclaiming that it would be 
inefficient to certify all workers when those with arbitration agreements would likely be disqualified 
after lengthy motion practice). 
 60 See, e.g., Campanelli v. Image First Healthcare Laundry Specialists, Inc., 15-cv-04456-PJH, 
2018 WL 6727825 at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2018) (explaining that the court need not evaluate wheth-
er the arbitration agreements were enforceable, although it did, when declining certification of the 
employees who had signed them); Daugherty, 838 F. Supp. 2d at 1130 (stating that because the arbi-
tration agreements were enforceable, it would be frivolous to notify those employees who had signed 
them). Without a binding arbitration agreement, collective action waivers and mandatory arbitration 
proceedings would be unenforceable, and thus employee-plaintiffs would not have waived their right 
to judicial process. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2018) (providing that if an arbitration 
agreement does not meet certain criteria, the parties will not be referred to arbitration proceedings). 
 61 See In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 499 n.6 (explaining that three frameworks exist in the 
district courts); e.g., Sawyer v. Health Care Sols. at Home, Inc., No. 5:16-cv-5674, 2018 WL 
1959632, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2018) (holding that signing arbitration agreements does not pre-
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The Second Approach is based on the theory that all employee-plaintiffs have a 
right to receive notice of potential FLSA claims.62 This resolution framework 
reasons that the right to receive notice of FLSA claims is independent of the 
right to participate in a collective action.63 Accordingly, once conditionally 
certified and notified, the employee-plaintiffs who are subject to arbitration 
will be siphoned off to arbitration via the defendants’ motion practices.64 Some 
district courts have emphasized that the Second Approach is sound policy be-
cause it allows the statute of limitations to toll and creates a placeholder for 
employee-plaintiffs who have claims that an arbitrator determines must be ad-
dressed in federal court.65 
Similarly, in the third resolution district courts advanced before In re 
JPMorgan Chase, courts certify collective actions and notify employees who 
have signed arbitration agreements (the Third Approach).66 The Third Approach 
                                                                                                                           
clude employees from conditional certification and notice); Williams v. Omainsky, CIVIL ACTION 
No. 15-0123-WS-N, 2016 WL 297718, at *8 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 21, 2016) (holding that, by signing arbi-
tration agreements, employee-plaintiffs did not forfeit the right to receive notice of FLSA claims); 
Barnett v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., No. CIV.A.3:01-CV-1182-M, 2002 WL 1023161, at *2 
(N.D. Tex. May 21, 2002) (permitting plaintiffs to notify employees, even those who assented to arbi-
tration agreements). 
 62 See Williams, 2016 WL 297718, at *8 (holding that assenting to an arbitration agreement did 
not bar employees from their right to notice of potential FLSA claims); Moore v. C&J Energy Servs. 
Inc., CIVIL ACTION NO. H-15-1136, 2015 WL 12940139, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2015) (holding 
that the choice to arbitrate claims does not negate the right to receive notice of FLSA claims). 
 63 See Williams, 2016 WL 297718, at *8 (recognizing a right to receive notice of FLSA claims); 
Moore, 2015 WL 12940139, at *5 (holding that there is an independent right to receive notice of 
FLSA claims). 
 64 See, e.g., Sawyer, 2018 WL 1959632, at *4 (postponing determination of the issue of the en-
forceability of arbitration agreements until final certification); Williams, 2016 WL 297718, at *32–33 
(explaining that at the decertification stage, a defendant may move to compel arbitration against those 
employees who signed arbitration agreements and attempted to opt into the class); Maddy v. Gen. 
Elec. Co., 59 F. Supp. 3d 675, 685, 685 n.7 (D.N.J. 2014) (allowing those who signed arbitration 
agreements to be conditionally certified and noting that at the second stage of certification they will be 
sent to arbitration); Barnett, 2002 WL 1023161, at *2 (deciding that, although employee-plaintiffs 
may notify all employees, only those who had not signed arbitration agreements could fully opt into 
the litigation).  
 65 See Williams, 2016 WL 297718, at *8 (explaining that simply agreeing to a different forum 
does not forfeit the right to receive notice of the litigation). The ability to opt in allows the employee-
plaintiff to return to federal court if the arbitrator so decides and avoids a situation in which his or her 
claim is precluded by the statute of limitations as a result of a potentially lengthy arbitration proceed-
ing. Id. at *8 n.15 (citing Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1106 (11th Cir. 1996)). A claim in 
an opt-in cause of action can only achieve a tolling of the statute of limitations where a plaintiff opts 
in after being conditionally certified and notified. Id. Additionally, a plaintiff can only accomplish 
subsequent re-entry into the collective action if the plaintiff opts in after the conditional certification 
stage but before the decertification stage. Id. 
 66 See In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 499 n.6 (explaining the three distinct frameworks); 
e.g., Meyer v. Panera Bread Co., 344 F. Supp. 3d 193, 206-07 (D.D.C. 2018) (certifying the collec-
tive); Weckesser v. Knight Enters. S.E., LLC, Civil Action No. 2:16-CV-02053-RMG, 2018 WL 
4087931, at *3 (D.S.C. Aug. 27, 2018) (allowing conditional certification of opt-in employee-
plaintiffs that allegedly assented to arbitration agreements); Hanson v. Gamin Cargo Control, Inc., 
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is based on the idea that the agreements might be unenforceable, and courts 
should therefore evaluate them on the merits.67 Accordingly, the enforceability 
of these arbitration agreements should be addressed at the decertification stage, 
because discovery is necessary to illuminate the facts necessary for this deter-
mination.68 
B. The Positioning of the Fifth Circuit’s Decision  
Within the Three Frameworks 
In In re JPMorgan Chase, the Fifth Circuit defined possible employee-
plaintiffs as persons ultimately eligible to participate in the pending suit.69 By 
clearly defining a subset of employees who district courts could not treat as 
possible employee-plaintiffs, the Fifth Circuit’s decision gave district courts a 
basis on which to exercise the broad discretion that Hoffmann-La Roche gave 
them.70 More importantly, In re JPMorgan Chase instructed district courts 
within the Fifth Circuit not to conditionally certify employees who have signed 
arbitration agreements so long as the agreements are shown to be valid under 
state contract law.71 
Although at first glance this framework may seem like a straightforward 
adoption of the First Approach, the two-pronged aspect is a hybrid of the First 
Approach and the Third Approach.72 The framework that the Fifth Circuit cre-
                                                                                                                           
CIVIL ACTION NO: 4:13-CV-0027, 2013 WL 12107666, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2013) (providing 
notice to all potential class members). 
 67 See Meyer, 344 F. Supp. 3d at 206 (reasoning that because court assesses the enforceability of 
arbitration agreements on their merits, it is better to make that decision at the decertification stage); 
Weckesser, 2018 WL 4087931, at *3 (allowing the conditional certification of opt-in employee-
plaintiffs that allegedly assented to arbitration agreements because a determination of the enforceabil-
ity of such agreements would not be properly before the court until the employee-plaintiffs join the 
action); Hanson, 2013 WL 12107666, at *2 (holding that the issue of whether a plaintiff who opts in 
is subject to a valid arbitration agreement is to be determined through discovery and decertification). 
 68 See supra note 67 (citing to cases employing the Third Approach, wherein the courts believed 
it better to rule on the validity of arbitration agreements after discovery). 
 69 In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 502. The court concluded that considering individuals 
unable to take part in the litigation to be potential employee-plaintiffs would have contradicted the 
Supreme Court’s admonitions in Hoffmann-La Roche v. Sperling. Id. (citing Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 
U.S. at 174). 
 70 Compare Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 170 (giving district courts discretion to authorize 
notice without providing guidance on how to exercise it), with In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 
501–02 (holding that a district court may not send notice to an employee subject to a binding arbitra-
tion agreement). Hoffmann-La Roche clarified that district courts did not have unchecked discretion in 
managing collective action notification by admonishing district courts to maintain judicial neutrality. 
493 U.S. at 174. 
 71 In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 502–03. 
 72 See id. (mixing the First Approach, under which courts refuse to certify and notify those who 
have assented to valid arbitration agreements, with the Third Approach, under which courts evaluate 
the arbitration agreements to ensure their validity); infra notes 73–76 and accompanying text (describ-
ing the Fifth Circuit’s approach’s resemblance to the First and Third approaches). 
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ated in In re JPMorgan Chase largely resembles the First Approach because it 
refuses to conditionally certify and notify individuals who have assented to 
valid arbitration agreements.73 The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning, like that of other 
courts that have employed the First Approach, was based on the concerns of 
judicial efficiency discussed in Hoffmann-La Roche.74 By evaluating whether 
the arbitration agreement was binding under state contract law, however, the 
Fifth Circuit’s framework also incorporated the policy reasoning at the heart of 
the Third Approach.75 It did so by stopping short of ruling that courts must au-
tomatically certify and notify employees who signed arbitration agreements 
and, instead, making sure district courts first answer whether the agreements 
are valid under state contract law.76 
                                                                                                                           
 73 Compare In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 503 (holding that where a preponderance of the 
evidence shows that the employee entered a valid arbitration agreement, a district court may not notify 
that employee), with Hudgins, 2017 WL 514191, at *4 (limiting notice to only those who had not 
signed arbitration agreements), Fischer, 2014 WL 3817368, at *8 (preventing employees with arbitra-
tion agreements from joining the certified collective), and Morangelli, 2010 WL 11622886, at *3 
(excluding from the conditionally certified class those employees who signed binding arbitration 
agreements). 
 74 In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 502 (citing Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 174); see 
Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 174 (stating that the purpose of notice facilitation is the need for 
expedient disposition in one proceeding). The Fifth Circuit, like district courts adopting the First Ap-
proach, emphasized the drain on efficiency that accompanies notifying individuals who will ultimately 
be removed from the proceeding. Compare In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 502 (explaining that 
notifying those who cannot ultimately participate in the collective action encourages litigation), with 
Hudgins, 2017 WL 514191, at *4 (noting the judicial waste created by allowing employee-plaintiffs 
with arbitration agreements to join only for them to be dismissed because of those agreements), and 
Morangelli, 2010 WL 11622886, at *3 (referring to the judicial inefficiency of certifying all workers 
when those with arbitration agreements would likely be dismissed regardless). 
 75 See In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 502–03 (noting the Fifth Circuit’s framework); Meyer, 
344 F. Supp. 3d at 206 (certifying the collective because the enforceability of arbitration agreements is 
determined on the merits); Weckesser, 2018 WL 4087931, at *3 (allowing conditional certification 
because the court had no ability to determine whether the arbitration agreements were enforceable); 
Hanson, 2013 WL 12107666, at *2 (holding that because the court would deal with the issue of the 
arbitration agreement’s validity after discovery, employee-plaintiffs were entitled to notify all poten-
tial class members). The Fifth Circuit attempted to alleviate the concern that the unenforceability of 
arbitration agreements would require courts to unnecessarily notify employees who are ineligible to 
join the class. In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 502–03. More specifically, the Fifth Circuit provid-
ed that a district court should permit parties to submit additional evidence on this issue and should 
make sure that an employer seeking to preclude an employee carries the burden of proof by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. Id. 
 76 Compare In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 502–03 (providing that to disqualify employee-
plaintiffs from collective action notification, employers must prove that the arbitration agreement is 
binding), with Meyer, 344 F. Supp. 3d at 206 (holding that the enforceability of arbitration agreements 
is a determination based on the merits that is best made after conditional certification), Weckesser, 
2018 WL 4087931, at *3 (permitting conditional certification because the court was unable to deter-
mine the enforceability of the arbitration agreements), and Hanson, 2013 WL 12107666, at *2 (ruling 
that notice would be provided to all potential class members because the validity of arbitration agree-
ments should be addressed after discovery). 
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III. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S CORRECT RULING THREATENS  
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FLSA 
Although In re JPMorgan Chase & Co.’s framework for approaching 
FLSA notification of employees bound by arbitration agreements is only prece-
dential within the Fifth Circuit, it is the most faithful way to apply Hoffmann-La 
Roche v. Sperling, and other federal courts should embrace it.77 Section A of this 
Part discusses why the Fifth Circuit’s ruling was a correct interpretation and ex-
tension of the Supreme Court precedent.78 Section B proposes that, in light of the 
prevalence of arbitration agreements with collective action waivers, this frame-
work creates a problem going forward in the FLSA’s enforcement scheme.79 
A. The Fifth Circuit’s Framework Is the Most Closely  
Aligned with Supreme Court Case Law 
Before, In re JPMorgan Chase & Co., appellate courts have never clearly 
defined how district courts should exercise their discretion when facilitating 
notice in a collective action.80 Nonetheless, Hoffmann-La Roche provided two 
guideposts for the exercise of discretion.81 First, courts should use their discre-
tion to promote efficient proceedings.82 Second, courts should not use their 
discretion in a manner that appears to endorse the merits of the action.83 
The Fifth Circuit correctly defined “potential plaintiff” in the context of 
whether district courts have discretion to conditionally certify and provide no-
tice of FLSA collective actions to employee-plaintiffs who signed arbitration 
agreements because its decision is guided by the policy goals of Hoffmann-La 
Roche.84 The court rightly focused on the judicial waste that would accumulate 
                                                                                                                           
 77 See Hoffmann-La Roche v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170–72 (1989) (reasoning that the discre-
tion to facilitate notice emanates from a desire to expedite disposition of FLSA actions); In re JPMor-
gan Chase & Co., 916 F.3d 494, 499–500 (5th Cir. 2019) (explaining that conditionally certifying 
employees under binding arbitration agreements would create judicial inefficiencies). 
 78 See infra notes 80–90 and accompanying text. 
 79 See infra notes 91–102 and accompanying text. 
 80 Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 170 (giving district courts discretion to authorize notice but 
declining to detail how it should be exercised). 
 81 Id. at 170, 174 (proclaiming that district courts should use their discretion to promote judicial 
efficiency and neutrality). 
 82 Id. at 170. 
 83 Id. at 174 (explaining that the discretion to facilitate notice is born out of the goal to expedite 
disposition of actions, but that the discretion should not be unfettered to the degree that it appears as 
judicial endorsement of the action). 
 84 See id. at 170, 174 (providing the policy goals behind the notice facilitation authority); In re 
JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 502 (agreeing with the petitioners that possible plaintiffs should be 
those who will be eligible to partake in the action). The Fifth Circuit quickly disarmed the rights-
based theory of the Second Approach by noting that Hoffmann-La Roche stated that district courts 
may, but are not required to, facilitate notice to possible plaintiffs. In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 
502, 503 n.19 (citing Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 174). 
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by notifying and adding employee-plaintiffs who would later be forced out of 
the action.85 Additionally, the court reasoned that notifying those not eligible to 
proceed could potentially lend itself to breaches of judicial neutrality.86 
The Fifth Circuit’s hybrid approach does the best of any current approach 
to minimize this risk of judicial inefficiency while also making sure that those 
bound by enforceable arbitration agreements are not notified.87 Full-scale 
adoption of both the Second and Third Approach would bring judicial ineffi-
ciency caused by dealing with extensive decertification motion practice.88 Giv-
en that the policy behind granting district courts discretion to facilitate notice 
is to have a single, efficient proceeding, it does not follow that district courts 
should allow employers to flood proceedings with motions to compel arbitra-
tion that have nothing to do with the FLSA claims.89 The Fifth Circuit’s hybrid 
                                                                                                                           
 85 See In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 502 (observing that notifying those who cannot partic-
ipate in the collective delays the litigation, which Hoffmann-La Roche prohibits).  
 86 See id. at 503–04 (describing the opinionated quotes from the district judge that the court took 
issue with). Most of the Fifth Circuit’s analysis involved comments the district judge made at the 
motion for conditional certification hearing, in which he called the employees “victims of illegality.” 
Id. The Fifth Circuit, however, also discussed Hoffmann-La Roche’s disallowance of notice facilita-
tion power being used for claim solicitation. Id. at 504. Hoffmann-La Roche’s prohibition of claim 
solicitation spurs from the idea that ordering that notice be sent to individuals who cannot participate 
would signal that the case had some merit and that those receiving notice should at least bring indi-
vidual claims, thus violating the policy of judicial neutrality. Id.; see Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 
174 (holding that district court intervention in the notice process must not be used for the solicitation 
of claims).  
 87 See In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 502–03 (prohibiting district courts from notifying em-
ployees with binding arbitration agreements because such notification would be inefficient, and man-
dating that employers must establish the validity of arbitration agreements before conditional certifica-
tion). The Third Approach is driven by the fear that arbitration agreements may be invalid and that 
employees who should get notice will not. See Weckesser v. Knight Enters. S.E., LLC, Civil Action 
No. 2:16-CV-02053-RMG, 2018 WL 4087931, at *3 (D.S.C. Aug. 27, 2018) (allowing the conditional 
certification of opt-in employee-plaintiffs bound by arbitration agreements because the court was 
unable to determine whether the agreements were enforceable). By allowing courts to address this 
issue before conditional certification, the Fifth Circuit quelled that fear. See In re JPMorgan Chase, 
916 F.3d at 502–03 (requiring employers to prove the existence and validity of the agreement when 
they seek to remove an employee from conditional certification based on an arbitration agreement). 
 88 See Hudgins v. Total Quality Logistics, LLC, No. 16 C 7331, 2017 WL 514191, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 
Feb. 8, 2017) (citing Daugherty v. Encana Oil & Gas (USA), Inc., 838 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1130 (D. 
Colo. 2011)) (observing the frivolousness of allowing those under arbitration agreements to join only 
to force defendants to formally move for dismissal later); Morangelli v. Chemed Corp., 10 Civ. 0876 
(BMC), 2010 WL 11622886, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 15, 2010) (mentioning the inefficiency of certify-
ing all workers when those under arbitration agreements would, after lengthy motion practice, be 
disqualified regardless). 
 89 See Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 170–72 (proclaiming that district courts’ authority to 
facilitate notice stems from the goal of expediting disposition of FLSA actions). Courts have agreed—
because of judicial and monetary efficiency—to address arbitration agreements initially, rather than 
waiting until after discovery to deal with potentially thousands of individual motions to compel arbi-
tration. See Morangelli, 2010 WL 11622886, at *3 (stating that it would be inefficient to certify all 
workers because those subject to arbitration agreements would likely be disqualified when the defend-
ant, ultimately, compelled arbitration); see also Hudgins, 2017 WL 514191, at *4 (noting the frivo-
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approach, influenced by the First Approach and the policy of efficient resolu-
tion, is therefore the most faithful way to apply Hoffmann-La Roche.90 
B. Projections and Implications Signal a Strain on  
FLSA Enforcement Moving Forward 
Although the Fifth Circuit’s decision may be legally correct, the frame-
work creates an opportunity that employers could use to escape private en-
forcement of the FLSA.91 If other courts were to adopt the Fifth Circuit’s hold-
ing in In re JPMorgan Chase, it could lead to a loophole through which em-
ployers could significantly reduce the risk of large FLSA collective actions.92 
The Fifth Circuit’s holding suggests that employees under binding arbitration 
agreements will never be notified of any potential claims.93 In that case, so 
long as those agreements are valid, employees who file the suit will move 
swiftly to arbitration, and others will never receive notice that they may have a 
claim.94 Furthermore, the existence, use, and effect of this loophole will likely 
                                                                                                                           
lousness of allowing employee-plaintiffs with arbitration agreements to join a collective action only to 
force a defendant to move for dismissal based on those arbitration agreements (citing Daugherty, 838 
F. Supp. 2d at 1130)). 
 90 See Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 170–72 (noting the purpose of expediting the disposition 
of suits); In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 502 (explaining that granting district courts authority to 
conditionally certify employees who signed binding arbitration agreements would allow entrance for 
plaintiffs who cannot ultimately participate). The framework that the Fifth Circuit laid out mirrors the 
policy and function of the First Approach, with the exception that the Fifth Circuit evaluates the en-
forceability of arbitration agreements before deciding whether to conditionally certify and give notice. 
See In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 499 n.6 (describing the First Approach, which excludes em-
ployees who are bound by arbitration agreements from the conditionally certified collective, and thus, 
from receiving notice). 
 91 See infra notes 92–95 and accompanying text (illuminating how the Fifth Circuit’s ruling may 
create a novel loophole for employers wishing to avoid FLSA collective action). 
 92 See In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 502 (holding that district courts do not have discretion 
to send notification of FLSA collective actions to employees under binding arbitration agreements). 
The assumption that other federal courts will adopt the Fifth Circuit’s holding is not farfetched, as 
district courts within the Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have since done so. See, e.g., Graham v. 
Word Enters. Perry, LLC, Case No. 18-cv-10167, 2019 WL 2959169, at *5 (E.D. Mich. June 18, 
2019) (following the Fifth Circuit’s decision in In re JPMorgan Chase & Co.); Dietrich v. C.H. Rob-
inson Worldwide, Inc., Case No: 18 C 4871, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48555, at *3–5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 
20, 2019) (same); Mode v. S-L Distrib. Co., LLC, 3:18-cv-00150-RJC-DSC, 2019 WL 1232855, *4 
n.3 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 14, 2019) (same). 
 93 See In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 502 (holding that district courts cannot send notice of 
FLSA collective actions to employees bound by arbitration agreements). 
 94 See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2018) (providing for the enforcement of written 
agreements to arbitrate); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (declaring 
Supreme Court policy to enforce arbitration agreements so long as they are valid under contract law); 
In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 502 (ruling that it is not within district courts’ discretion to send 
notification of FLSA collective actions to employees bound by arbitration agreements); Bradt & Rave, 
supra note 38 (noting the commonplace practice of including such clauses in employment contracts). 
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become more prevalent as the percentage of American labor governed by arbi-
tration agreements continues to climb.95 
The potential widespread use of the loophole raises concerns about the fu-
ture effectiveness of the FLSA.96 As a result of the loophole, employees would 
find it more difficult to join claims and form collective actions.97 This inability 
would undermine the collective action prong of the FLSA, one of its two en-
forcement mechanisms.98 If employees cannot join collective actions, it may 
be economically infeasible for them to bring these costly suits alone.99 This 
would leave FLSA enforcement solely to the Department of Labor, which can-
not reasonably protect all workers’ rights.100 Ultimately, if the FLSA seriously 
lacks or entirely loses one of its enforcement mechanisms, it is substantially 
likely that it will fail to achieve its goal of maintaining suitable working condi-
tions for American workers.101 Thus, to protect the integrity of the FLSA’s col-
lective action prong and its overarching goals, proponents and protectors of 
American labor should petition the legislative branch to amend the FLSA and 
prevent the existence of arbitration agreements from interfering with employ-
ee’s collective action rights.102 
CONCLUSION 
In In re JPMorgan Chase & Co., the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ad-
dressed whether a district court may give notice of potential FLSA claims to em-
                                                                                                                           
 95 See AT&T Mobility LLC, 563 U.S. at 339 (declaring liberal federal policy favoring arbitration 
agreements); Sternlight, supra note 7, at 1310 (citing an empirical analysis regarding the percentage of 
the American workforce under arbitration agreements). As of the date of this Comment, roughly twen-
ty percent of non-unionized American labor force is covered by arbitration agreements, and this num-
ber is expected to rise according to past trends and current empirical research. Sternlight, supra note 7, 
at 1312 n.9. 
 96 See infra notes 97–102 and accompanying text (explaining how the loophole created by the 
Fifth Circuit’s ruling may erode the effectiveness of FLSA enforcement via collective action). 
 97 See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (providing for the enforcement of written agreements to arbitrate); In re 
JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 504 (holding that district courts cannot notify employees under binding 
arbitration agreement of FLSA collective actions). 
 98 See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2018) (describing collective action 
enforcement). The FLSA provides that an action can be brought on behalf of a singular employee or 
on behalf of all employees similarly situated. Id. The Department of Labor publicly enforces the 
FLSA, whereas individual employee-plaintiffs who consolidate similar claims into collective actions 
privately enforce it. Id. 
 99 See Foster, supra note 23, at 296–97 (explaining the rationale for private enforcement). 
 100 Id. 
 101 See 29 U.S.C. § 202 (declaring the goals of the FLSA); Foster, supra note 23, at 296–97 (de-
scribing that Congress envisioned that private collective action suits would work in tandem with pub-
lic enforcement through the Department of Labor to meet FLSA’s goals). 
 102 See Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 49, 5, 61 Stat. 84, 84, 87 (codified as amended 
29 U.S.C. § 216(b)) (requiring FLSA employee-plaintiffs to file written consent with the court to be 
added to an action); In re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d at 502 (holding that employees bound by arbi-
tration agreements cannot be receive notice of FLSA collective actions from district courts). 
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ployees who signed binding arbitration agreements. In its analysis, the Fifth Cir-
cuit noted and examined the three different approaches that federal district courts 
have applied to such situations. The Fifth Circuit ultimately sided with the vari-
ous federal district courts that have refused to certify and notify such employees. 
Applying Hoffmann-La Roche v. Sperling, the court defined the potential plain-
tiffs whom district courts have discretion to notify as only those employee-
plaintiffs who may ultimately partake in the suit. Thus, the Fifth Circuit held 
that, so long as arbitration agreements are binding, district courts may not send 
notice of collective action suits to the employees bound by such agreements. In 
so ruling, the Fifth Circuit faithfully relied on Hoffmann-La Roche’s emphasis 
on judicial efficiency. Although the Fifth Circuit’s holding was a correct mod-
ernization of Hoffmann-La Roche, because it was grounded primarily on judicial 
efficiency, the decision may lead to the erosion of the FLSA. 
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